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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Kannankerils, Dr. Mary Kannankeril, her husband, 
Charles, and their children, Charlene and Crystal, sued a 
pest exterminator, the Terminix International Company L.P. 
("Terminix"), seeking damages for injuries allegedly arising 
out of the application of pesticides to their residence. The 
district court found the opinion of Dr. Benjamin Gerson, 
the medical expert of Dr. Mary Kannankeril, to be 
unreliable and unsupported by facts. Having excluded Dr. 
Gerson's opinion, the district court held that Dr. 
Kannankeril had failed to produce any evidence that her 
cognitive impairment had been caused by exposure to 
pesticides applied by Terminix. The court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Terminix. The admissibility of Dr. 
Gerson's opinion is the sole issue on which the 
Kannankerils have appealed. They argue that the district 
court erroneously excluded the testimony of Dr. Gerson. 
 
We conclude that the district court improperly exercised 
its gatekeeping role by excluding Dr. Gerson's testimony. 
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Accordingly, we will vacate that portion of the order of the 
district court, granting summary judgment against Dr. 
Mary Kannankeril on this point, and we will remand this 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The Kannankerils entered into a one-year contract with 
Terminix on May 30, 1989, for the control of carpenter ants 
through the application of pesticides to certain interior 
portions and the outside deck of the Kannankerils' 
residence. From May 31, 1989, through October 5, 1990, 
Terminix treated the Kannankeril residence on at least 
twenty occasions at intervals ranging from once a month to 
twice in a three day period. Terminix applied pesticides, 
containing Dursban, until the Kannankerils canceled the 
service on October 5, 1990. 
 
Dursban, the active ingredient in certain pesticides used 
by Terminix, is a formulation of chlorpyrifos, an 
organophosphate poison. The organophosphates kill insects 
by inhibiting the normal breakdown of acetylcholine, which 
functions as a neurotransmitter in several life forms, 
including humans. The Kannankerils argue that despite the 
well-known chronic effects of chlorpyrifos, Dursban was 
sprayed excessively and improperly in their home. For 
example, Dursban was sprayed on the cooking range, 
around the dishwasher, and on the baseboard heater. 
Dursban was also sprayed in cupboards where pots and 
pans were stored. Terminix, however, claims that any liquid 
pesticide that was applied consisted almost entirely of 
water, with minute concentrations of liquid pesticide added 
to make the final active solution. 
 
The Kannankerils' suit against Terminix involved alleged 
injury to Dr. Mary Kannankeril, a former Medical Director 
of Psychiatric Emergency Services at Saint Mary's Hospital 
in Passaic, New Jersey. Dr. Kannankeril claims to suffer 
wide-ranging physiological and cognitive symptoms from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Our decision, vacating the summary judgment against Dr. 
Kannankeril, is without prejudice to any motion for summary judgment 
on other grounds which Terminix may bring. 
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exposure to the pesticides, including Dursban, applied by 
Terminix.3 The symptoms first appeared in August 1990, 
over one year after Terminix began its service. The 
Kannankerils did not relate Dr. Kannankeril's symptoms 
with Terminix's ongoing pesticide applications until October 
1990. After the entire family developed a rash, the 
Kannankerils began to suspect Dursban as the cause of 
their problems. When the Kannankerils complained of a 
strong odor in their home after the last application, 
Terminix sent Service Master to clean the Kannankerils' 
residence. In July 1991, nine months after the last 
application of pesticide, the Kannankerils requested that 
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
("DEP") test their residence for the existence of pesticides. 
The DEP collected air samples from the residence on July 
10, 1991. An analysis of the samples indicated non- 
detectable levels of pesticides. 
 
Dr. Kannankeril allegedly developed chronic toxicity 
related to exposure to chlorpyrifos and became sensitized to 
multiple other chemicals so that further exposure to 
organophosphates would result in disabling physical 
problems. As a result of her ill health, she gave up her 
hospital position in March, 1993, and now sees patients 
only in an office at home. 
 
Plaintiffs named Dr. Benjamin Gerson, M.D., to testify as 
a medical expert to establish that exposure to Dursban 
caused Dr. Kannankeril's injury.4 Dr. Gerson provided the 
following opinion: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Only the causation of Dr. Kannankeril's cognitive impairment remains 
an issue in the case. These cognitive deficits include memory loss, 
concentration loss, sleeplessness, general anxiety, and headaches. Her 
other alleged physical symptoms included insomnia, numbness, muscle 
twitching, pain in muscles and joints, vaginal bleeding, urinary 
incontinence, nausea, skin rashes, and depigmentation patches 
throughout her body. 
 
4. Dr. Gerson's qualifications included: Physician certified by the 
American Board of Toxicology and the American Board of Pathology; 
Director of the Boston University School of Medicine's Laboratory of 
Analytical Toxicology and Director of the Research Data Worldwide 
Clinical Laboratory; Consultant to the Food and Drug Administration's 
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       The temporal relationship and the nature of her 
       complaints lead me to conclude that with reasonable 
       medical certainty, the cause of Dr. Kannankeril's 
       Central Nervous System manifestations of toxicity is 
       exposure to Dursban in 1989 to 1990. 
 
App. at 51.5 Dr. Gerson is the only medical expert proffered 
by the Kannankerils on causation and his opinion is limited 
to the causation of Dr. Kannankeril's cognitive impairment. 
His findings are based on Dr. Kannankeril's account of her 
cognitive symptoms and on a report prepared by Dr. Ellen 
Grober, a neuropsychologist who examined Dr. 
Kannankeril. Dr. Gerson also relied on a summary report of 
the times and amounts of Dursban applications to the 
Kannankeril home as well as on his general experience and 
readings, general medical knowledge, standard textbooks, 
and standard references. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
A district court's ruling on admissibility of expert 
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Government of 
the Virgin Islands v. Sanes, 57 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 
1995); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 749 (3d 
Cir. 1994). To the extent that the district court's ruling 
turns on interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Center for Devices and Radiological Health; Professor of Pathology and a 
Professor of Pharmacology & Experimental Therapeutics at Boston 
University; Instructor in Pathology, Harvard Medical School; Special 
Lecturer in Clinical Laboratory Science, Northeastern University; 
Assistant Professor of Pathology, Harvard Medical School; Associate 
Professor of Pathology, Harvard Medical School; Director of Clinical 
Chemistry and Toxicology at Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Boston, 
Massachusetts. 
 
5. Under New Jersey law, medical expert testimony must be made with 
a reasonable degree of certainty. See Bondi v. Pole, 246 N.J. Super. 236 
(App. Div. 1991); Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 240 N.J. 
Super. 289 (App.Div. 1990); Johnesee v. The Stop & Shop Companies, 
174 N.J. Super. 426 (App.Div. 1980). New Jersey's rule should govern in 
the present case since it is a substantive law that is part of the 
appellants' burden of proof. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 
717, 752 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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our review is plenary. United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 
844, 848 (3d Cir. 1995); Paoli, 35 F.3d at 749. We review 
the district court's findings of fact under a clearly 
erroneous standard. Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 848. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Standard of Admissibility for Expert Testimony 
 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is the role of the 
trial judge to act as a "gatekeeper" to ensure that any and 
all expert testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but 
also reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 589. (1993). The Rules of Evidence embody 
a strong and undeniable preference for admitting any 
evidence which has the potential for assisting the trier of 
fact. See Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 780 
(3d Cir. 1996). Rule 702, which governs the admissibility of 
expert testimony, has a liberal policy of admissibility. See 
Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 780; Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741. 
 
Rule 702 has three major requirements: (1) the proffered 
witness must be an expert; (2) the expert must testify about 
matters requiring scientific, technical or specialized 
knowledge; and (3) the expert's testimony must assist the 
trier of fact. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741-42. The issue of this 
appeal involves the second requirement of the expert's 
testimony. In interpreting this second requirement, we have 
concluded that "an expert's testimony is admissible so long 
as the process or technique the expert used in formulating 
the opinion is reliable." Id. at 742 (citing Daubert, 113 S.Ct. 
at 2794-95). In order for the expert testimony to be 
"reliable," we have required that the testimony be based on 
the "methods and procedures of science," rather than on 
"subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Paoli, 35 
F.3d at 744. Moreover, Daubert does not set up a test of 
which opinion has the best foundation, but rather whether 
any particular opinion is based on valid reasoning and 
reliable methodology. Admissibility decisions focus on the 
expert's methods and reasoning; credibility decisions arise 
after admissibility has been determined. See Paoli, 35 F.3d 
at 743-46. 
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There are several factors that a district court should take 
into account in evaluating whether a particular scientific 
methodology is reliable. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742.6 
Although these factors are neither exhaustive nor 
applicable in every case, they provide a convenient starting 
point for analyzing the opinion of Dr. Gerson. Our inquiry 
focuses on principles and methodology and not on the 
conclusions they generate. Id. at 744. The analysis of the 
conclusions themselves is for the trier of fact when the 
expert is subjected to cross-examination. Id. The 
Kannankerils needed to demonstrate by a preponderance of 
evidence only that Dr. Gerson's opinion was based on "good 
grounds." Id. 
 
B. Reliability of Dr. Gerson's Testimony 
 
The district court refused to admit Dr. Gerson's 
testimony because of insufficient factual foundation to 
prove that the cause of Dr. Kannankeril's cognitive 
impairment was exposure to Dursban. We conclude, 
however, that Dr. Gerson's opinion meets the requirements 
for the admission of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, as set forth in Daubert and 
interpreted by us in Paoli. 
 
1. Differential Diagnosis 
 
In its opposition to Dr. Gerson's testimony, Terminix has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. These nonexclusive guidelines, drawn from Daubert and this Court's 
opinion in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1223 (3d Cir. 1985), 
include: 
 
       (1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2) whether 
       the method has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or 
       potential rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of 
       standards controlling the technique's operation; (5) whether the 
       method is generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the technique 
to 
       methods which have been established to be reliable; (7) the 
       qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the 
       methodology; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has 
       been put. 
 
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8. 
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emphasized that Dr. Gerson did not himself perform any 
diagnostic medical tests. Terminix argues that Dr. Gerson 
did not employ sufficient diagnostic techniques to have 
good grounds for his conclusions or to have properly 
performed a differential diagnosis. We have recognized 
"differential diagnosis" as a technique that involves 
assessing causation with respect to a particular individual. 
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 758. Differential diagnosis is defined for 
physicians as "the determination of which of two or more 
diseases with similar symptoms is the one from which the 
patient is suffering, by a systematic comparison and 
contrasting of the clinical findings." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY 428 (25th ed. 1990). The elements of a 
differential diagnosis may consist of the performance of 
physical examinations, the taking of medical histories, and 
the review of clinical tests, including laboratory tests. A 
doctor does not have to employ all of these techniques in 
order for the doctor's diagnosis to be reliable. See Paoli, 35 
F.3d at 759. A differential diagnosis may be reliable with 
less than all the types of information set out above. See id. 
Indeed, as we held in Paoli, "to the extent that the district 
court concluded otherwise [i.e., that a differential diagnosis 
made on less than all types of information cannot be 
reliable], we hold that it abused its discretion." Id. 
 
Depending on the medical condition at issue and on the 
clinical information already available, a physician may 
reach a reliable differential diagnosis without himself 
performing a physical examination, particularly if there are 
other examination results available. In fact, it is perfectly 
acceptable, in arriving at a diagnosis, for a physician to rely 
on examinations and tests performed by other medical 
practitioners. 
 
These principles are applicable to the admissibility of 
Dr. Gerson's expert opinion regarding Dr. Kannankeril. The 
district court found that Dr. Gerson never performed any 
clinical tests to support his opinion of causation. Dr. 
Gerson did not "examine, or even speak to" Dr. 
Kannankeril. Instead, Dr. Gerson reviewed the records of 
Dr. Kannankeril's medical history. Dr. Gerson also relied on 
Dr. Grober's report of Dr. Kannankeril's neuropsychological 
complaints and of her cognitive impairment. Terminix does 
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not claim that the medical records relied upon by Dr. 
Gerson were incomplete or inaccurate. As noted by this 
Court in Paoli, "evaluation of the patient's medical records 
is a reliable method of concluding that a patient is ill even 
in the absence of a physical examination." Id. at 762. A 
doctor needs only one reliable source of information 
showing that a plaintiff is ill; either a physical test or 
medical records will suffice for this. Id. at 762. For these 
reasons, the reliability of Dr. Gerson's opinion is not 
necessarily diminished by the fact that he himself did not 
perform a physical examination. 
 
Moreover, in making his evaluation, Dr. Gerson was 
aware that one test, the cholinesterase blood test, did not 
produce abnormal results. The district court noted that the 
blood test for cholinesterase levels is "the most accepted 
test method for determining exposure to Dursban." 
However, the cholinesterase test result is but one of the 
factors considered by Dr. Gerson. Despite the negative 
results from this test, Dr. Gerson still opined that, as a 
matter of reasonable medical certainty, Dursban had 
caused Dr. Kannankeril's cognitive impairment. It is for the 
jury to decide whether a single cholinesterase test, yielding 
results within normal limits, outweighs the other factors 
relied upon by Dr. Gerson and undermines his opinion. 
This is an issue of credibility, not of admissibility. 
 
Furthermore, we do not agree with the trial court's 
finding that "every" objective medical test showed normal 
results. The cholinesterase test was not the only clinical 
test performed on Dr. Kannankeril. Dr. Grober, the 
neuropsychologist at the Albert Einstein Medical Center, 
confirmed a diminution in Dr. Kannankeril's cognitive 
abilities. 
 
In attacking the differential diagnosis performed by the 
plaintiff's expert, the defendant may point to a plausible 
cause of the plaintiff's illness other than the defendant's 
actions. It then becomes necessary for the plaintiff's expert 
to offer a good explanation as to why his or her conclusion 
remains reliable. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 762. Dr. Gerson, 
however, was never challenged by the presentation of 
alternate diagnoses by other physicians. Moreover, 
Terminix, in challenging Dr. Gerson's opinion, has not 
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raised any other theory of causation for Dr. Kannankeril's 
cognitive impairment.7 The record in this case is devoid of 
any alternate diagnosis which Dr. Gerson ignored or failed 
to consider. 
 
Furthermore, we reject Terminix's argument that Dr. 
Gerson admitted to alternate causes other than exposure to 
Dursban for Dr. Kannankeril's condition. Dr. Gerson had 
testified at his deposition that something other than 
exposure to organophosphates "could" have caused each of 
the individual symptoms displayed by Dr. Kannankeril. 
While, however, an alternate explanation for each of Dr. 
Kannankeril's individual symptoms may exist separately, 
Dr. Gerson concluded with reasonable medical certainty 
that Dursban was the most likely cause of her condition as 
a whole. Terminix's exploration of the cause of each 
individual symptom goes not to the admissibility of the 
evidence but to its weight. 
 
2. Degree of Exposure 
 
The Kannankerils also contend that the district erred in 
finding that Dr. Gerson had no knowledge of Dr. 
Kannankeril's degree of exposure to Dursban. According to 
the district court, Dr. Gerson did not know the levels of 
Dursban at the Kannankerils' home at the time of 
exposure, and he did not know the amount of time 
plaintiffs spent in the home. We conclude, however, that 
the district court erred when it failed to recognize that Dr. 
Gerson had sufficient knowledge of exposure from his 
review of Terminix's application records, showing when, 
how much, and where pesticide had been applied. 
 
Terminix asserts, however, that these application records 
are "unreliable as a matter of law as a tool" to determine 
Dr. Kannankeril's exposure. The trial court agreed and 
ruled that the only information reviewed by Dr. Gerson 
which addressed actual levels of pesticides in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Terminix had, of course, no obligation to present an alternate theory 
of causation in its effort to have Dr. Gerson's opinion excluded. However, 
in determining whether a proper differential diagnosis was conducted, a 
consideration of other diagnoses may be relevant. 
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 Kannankeril home was the analysis performed by the DEP 
in July 1991, nine months after the last application of 
Dursban. The results of that sampling indicated non- 
detectable levels of pesticides. 
 
We find that Terminix's assertion is without merit. First, 
there is no expert opinion in the record to establish that an 
ambient air test, particularly an ambient air test performed 
nine months after the final application of Dursban, is the 
only appropriate way in this case to gauge exposure to the 
organophosphate. Moreover, the plaintiffs were prepared to 
offer into evidence the Dursban product label which 
contained warnings such as: "HARMFUL IF SWALLOWED . 
HARMFUL IF ABSORBED THROUGH SKIN . CAUSES EYE 
AND SKIN IRRITATION" and "Throughly wash dishes and 
food handling utensils with soap and water if they become 
contaminated by application of this product. Do not allow 
children or pets to contact treated surfaces until spray has 
dried." App. at 241-43. Under the facts as presented in this 
case, the district judge erred in ruling that an expert may 
rely only on the ambient air test to determine whether Dr. 
Kannankeril had been exposed to Dursban. Instead, all 
factual evidence of the presence of the chemicals in the 
residence should be relevant in forming an expert opinion 
of causation. 
 
We conclude that it is for the trier of fact to determine 
what weight to give the ambient air test results as an 
indication of exposure. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 
F.3d 524, 534 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing exclusion of 
expert opinions that plaintiffs' exposure to certain 
chemicals caused his lung cancer where there were issues 
of fact whether plaintiff was actually exposed to the 
chemicals so that summary judgment based on a finding of 
no exposure was inappropriate). The issue whether an 
ambient air test should be given more weight than pesticide 
application records goes to the weight rather than the 
admissibility of evidence. See United States v. Velasquez, 64 
F.3d 844, 848 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. 
Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir. 1992)). The trial judge 
must be careful not to mistake credibility questions for 
admissibility questions. 
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3. Peer Review and Publication 
 
Two other factors that a district court can take into 
account in assessing reliability are peer-review and 
publication. They may not, however, in every case be 
necessary conditions of reliability. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
593; Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742. In the instant case, Dr. Gerson 
admitted that he has not produced any publication on 
organophosphates. Because the toxic effects of 
organophosphates on humans are well recognized by the 
scientific community, however, Dr. Gerson's opinion is not 
a novel scientific theory regarding organophosphates.8 
Instead, Dr. Gerson merely reported that Dr. Kannankeril 
exhibited the "signs and symptoms of chronic toxicity 
related to exposure to chlorpyrifos (Dursban)." Thus, 
although Dr. Gerson did not write on the topic, his opinion 
is supported by widely accepted scientific knowledge of the 
harmful nature of organophosphates. See also McCullock v. 
H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding 
that peer review and publication or general acceptance of 
an expert's theory goes to the weight of the testimony 
rather than its admissibility). 
 
Based on the record before us, we conclude that 
Dr. Gerson's opinion on causation has a factual basis 
and supporting scientific theory. Dr. Gerson based his 
opinion on Dr. Kannankeril's medical records, Dr. Grober's 
reports confirming her medical condition, and Terminix's 
application receipts. He also relied on general experience 
and readings, general medical knowledge, standard 
textbooks, and standard references. After considering all 
the relevant facts, Dr. Gerson reported that "[t]he temporal 
relationship and the nature of her complaints lead 
me to conclude that with reasonable medical certainty, the 
cause of Dr. Kannankeril's Central Nervous System 
manifestations of toxicity is exposure to Dursban in 1989 to 
1990." App. at 51. Dr. Gerson's testimony is neither 
conjecture nor speculation. His opinion was clearly stated 
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. It is an acknowledged scientific fact that chlorpyrifos, the active 
ingredient in Dursban, is harmful to humans and can cause the very 
symptoms displayed by Dr. Kannankeril. 
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Whether the appellants' expert might have done a better 
job is not the test. We have stated that "it is an abuse of 
discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial 
court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best 
qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the 
specialization that the court considers most appropriate." 
Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 782. If the expert meets liberal 
minimum qualifications, then the level of the expert's 
expertise goes to credibility and weight, not admissibility. 
See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741. The Second Circuit addressed a 
similar issue and commented that the expert's alleged 
shortcomings were raised properly on cross-examination 
and went to the credibility, not the admissibility, of his 
testimony. McCullock, 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995). 
Consequently, we reject Terminix's suggestion that Dr. 
Gerson must be a specialist in Dursban to provide expert 
testimony on the causation of Dr. Kannankeril's injury. 
 
The Kannankerils' burden is only to provide an expert 
opinion that is relevant and reliable and that will assist the 
trier of fact. As we have repeated above, issues of credibility 
arise after the determination of admissibility. Credibility is 
for the jury. We conclude that, under the facts presented 
here, the district court erred in ruling that Dr. Gerson's 
expert testimony on causation was inadmissible. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court 
erred as a matter of law in refusing to permit Dr. Gerson to 
testify as to his opinion of the causation of Dr. 
Kannankeril's illness. Accordingly, we will vacate that 
portion of the district court order which granted summary 
judgment against Dr. Mary Kannankeril, and we will 
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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